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however.1	 In	 such	 situations,	 a	 single	 individual	 contribution	 to	 the	 outcome	 –	 an	
individual	‘hand’	–	is	morally	insignificant	in	the	exact	same	sense	in	which	the	overall	
outcome	 is	 morally	 significant:	 it	 does	 not	 generate	 any	 of	 the	 relevant	 benefits	 or	
prevent	any	of	the	harms	at	issue.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	see	how	contributing	could	be	
required.	I	will	in	fact	assume	that,	intuitively,	it	is	rarely	acceptable	to	do	nothing.	The	







1	 See	 also	 Sinnott-Armstrong	 (2005).	 Note	 that	 over	 an	 entire	 lifespan,	 affluent	
individuals	do	cause	substantial	harm	(Nolt	2011).		
2	This	is	also	known	as	‘the	problem	of	inconsequentialism’	(Sandler	2009),	‘the	problem	



























I	 go	on	 to	 argue	 that	when	 too	 few	are	willing	 to	 contribute,	 individuals	 can	have	 an	
 4 
obligation	to	increase	their	number.	The	point	of	mobilizing	others	is	to	ensure	that	the	








‘insignificant	 hands	 situations,’	 which	 are	 defined	 by	 two	 further	 features.	 First,	 the	
collective	outcome	is	morally	desirable	or	significant	(‘collective	significance’).	Either	it	
is	beneficial	or	it	provides	a	neutral	alternative	to	a	harmful	outcome.	Second,	a	single	








outcome	 is	 inspired	 by	 the	 problem	 of	 many	 hands.	 Dennis	 Thompson	 (1980),	 who	
coined	 the	 term,	was	 troubled	by	 the	 fact	 that	when	 individuals	 cooperate	within	 the	
 
3	An	action	causally	contributes	to	an	outcome	exactly	if	it	is	a	necessary	element	of	a	set	
of	 actions	 that	 are	 sufficient	 for	 it.	 Thus,	 a	 contribution	 is	 a	 NESS-condition	 for	 the	
outcome	(Hart	and	Honoré	1959;	Mackie	1974;	Wright	1988).	
 5 
context	 of	 an	 organization,	 it	 is	 difficult	 if	 not	 impossible	 to	 disentangle	 their	





looking	 responsibility,	 or	 with	 whether	 people	 could	 be	 praised	 or	 blamed	 for	 their	

















and	 Pettit	 2011,	Hindriks	 2018).	 See	Van	 de	 Poel,	 Royakkers	 and	 Zwart	 (2015)	 for	 a	
discussion	of	the	problem	of	many	hands	in	relation	to	organized	collectives.	
 6 
Both	 examples	 concern	 individual	 hands	 situations.	 The	 patient’s	 and	 the	 villagers’	
survival	is	a	morally	significant	collective	outcome	(collective	significance).	Furthermore,	
isolated	contributions	will	not	have	morally	desirable	effects	(individual	insignificance).	












marginal,	 as	 is	 commonly	 assumed.	 Whereas	 Avram	 Hiller	 (2011)	 describes	 such	




Even	 Sinnott-Armstrong	 (2005)	 admits	 that	 it	 is	 prima	 facie	 plausible	 to	 say	 that	
joyguzzlers	should	refrain	from	engaging	in	their	activity,	although	he	goes	on	to	argue	





Sinnott-Armstrong	 2005).5	 In	 the	maximal	 solution,	 by	 contrast,	 almost	 everybody	 is	
obligated	to	do	so	(Murphy	2000,	Kagan	2011).6	The	claim	is	that	in	principle,	everybody	
who	can	contribute	ought	to	do	so.	The	main	difference	between	the	two	concerns	their	
causal	presuppositions:	 causal	 control	 versus	 causal	 contribution.7	 Before	 anyone	has	
contributed,	no	one	has	control	over	a	collective	outcome.	Once	two	of	the	nurses	in	Three	
Nurses	 have	 already	 administered	 their	 drugs,	 however,	 the	 third	 has	 control	 over	
whether	the	patient	lives	or	dies.	Typically,	everybody	is	able	to	contribute	to	a	collective	




appreciate	 is	 that	 the	 two	 defining	 features	 of	 insignificant	 hands	 situations	 pull	 in	
opposite	directions.	Collective	significance	makes	it	attractive	to	regard	contributing	as	





5 Sinnott-Armstrong	 (2005)	defends	 two	claims.	First,	 individuals	are	not	obligated	 to	





6	 Braham	 and	 van	 Hees	 (2012)	 defend	 the	 maximal	 solution	 for	 backward-looking	
responsibility.	 Using	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 NESS-condition,	 they	 argue	 that	 in	 principle,	
everybody	who	contributes	to	a	collective	harm	is	blameworthy.		



























	 Instead	 of	 success	 as	 such,	 the	 prospect	 account	 requires	 that	 the	 prospect	 of	




































search	 is	not	required.	Furthermore,	 the	thresholds	are	much	 lower	 in	 the	case	of	 the	
child	compared	to	the	teddy	bear	case,	as	is	suggested	by	the	difference	in	effort	required	
for	searching	for	them.	But	what	explains	this	contrast?	The	only	difference	between	the	
two	 examples	 concerns	what	 is	 lost,	 the	 teddy	 bear	 and	 the	 child.	 Clearly,	 the	moral	
significance	 of	 finding	 the	 child	 is	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 finding	 the	 teddy	 bear.	 Thus,	 I	
propose,	the	difference	between	these	examples	is	to	be	explained	in	terms	of	normative	
thresholds,	which	are	lower	when	the	significance	of	the	outcome	is	higher.	
Reconciling	 the	 recipient	 and	 contributor	 perspectives	 requires	 rejecting	 the	
extreme	solutions.	The	core	claim	of	an	intermediate	or	moderate	alternative	is	this:	in	
insignificant	hands	situations,	contributing	can,	but	need	not,	be	obligatory.	This	splits	




















one,	 this	act	may	be	wrong	because	 it	 is	one	of	a	set	of	acts	 that	 together	harm	other	
people’	(1984,	p.70).9	Furthermore,	he	proposes	that	the	extent	to	which	the	members	of	
a	group	believe	that	enough	others	will	act	a	certain	way	can	be	relevant	to	whether	they	
ought	 to	do	 so	 (ibid.,	 pp.77-78).	Reconciling	 the	 two	perspectives	 requires	embracing	
INTERDEPENDENCE.	
The	 notion	 of	 a	 normative	 threshold	 gives	 further	 substance	 to	 the	 proposed	
reconciliation.	 The	 prospect	 account	 entails	 that	 recipients	 do	 not	 have	 legitimate	
grounds	for	blaming	an	individual	when	the	prospect	of	helping	to	prevent	the	harm	is	
too	 low.	 Conversely,	 contributors	 cannot	 claim	 the	 moral	 high	 ground	 when	 their	










insignificance,	 the	 two	 defining	 features	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 insignificant	 hands.	





harm.’	 Both	 the	 presence	 of	 benefits	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 harms	 constitute	 morally	
desirable	outcomes.	Moral	norms	come	with	application	conditions	that	specify	when	a	
moral	 agent	 has	 the	 obligation	 that	 features	 in	 the	 norm.10	 The	 prospect	 account	
explicates	 those	 application	 conditions.	 It	 thereby	 delineates	which	 contributions	 are	























that	 increases	 the	 (objective)	 probability	 of	 the	 outcome	 to	 a	 sufficient	 extent.12	 And	
according	to	condition	2,	the	total	probability	must	be	high	enough	(not	too	low).	Both	
conditions	 can	 be	 illustrated	 by	Lost	 Teddy	 Bear	 and	Lost	 Child,	 given	 that	 the	moral	
weight	 of	 finding	 the	 child	 is	 substantially	higher	 than	 that	 of	 finding	 the	 teddy	bear.	
Suppose	there	is	someone	who	could	join	the	search	party.	It	might	be	that	the	extent	to	
which	his	efforts	would	increase	the	probability	of	success	is	not	high	enough	for	him	to	
be	obligated	to	search	 for	 the	 teddy	bear,	even	though	 it	 is	more	than	high	enough	to	
sustain	an	obligation	 to	 search	 for	 the	child.	 Similarly,	 the	 total	probability	of	 success	
might	be	too	low	if	the	teddy	bear	is	outside	of	the	mall,	whereas	it	will	be	high	enough	





























upper	 limit	 consists	 of	 those	 contributions	 that	 the	 agent	 has	 just	 enough	 reason	 to	
believe	will	 generate	 the	 smallest	 non-negligible	 increase	 in	 probability.	 Beyond	 that	
point,	 further	 contributions	 are	 not	 worthwhile.	 Thus,	 the	 prospect	 range	 delineates	
which	contributions	are	required.		



















insofar	 as	 it	 provides	 a	 coherent	 outlook	 on	 collective	 significance	 and	 individual	









sensitive	 to	whether	 the	 outcome	 is	 feasible	 and	 to	whether	 the	 action	 is	 redundant.	
When	an	outcome	is	not	feasible,	contributing	to	it	is	in	a	sense	futile.	To	be	sure,	some	
redundancy	can	be	a	good	thing,	as	it	can	serve	to	secure	the	outcome.	Beyond	a	certain	
point,	 however,	making	 a	 redundant	 contribution	 is	 pointless,	 and	morality	 does	 not	






If	 they	 were	 not	 constrained	 by	 the	 efficacy	 considerations,	 contributory	
obligations	 would	 be	 overly	 demanding.	 The	 limits	 to	 the	 risks	 of	 infeasibility	 and	
redundancy	are	set	by	thresholds.	They	determine	when	those	risks	are	acceptable.	This	
explains	 why	 the	 thresholds	 depend	 in	 part	 on	 normative	 factors,	 to	 wit	 the	 moral	
significance	of	the	outcome	and	the	morally	relevant	costs	of	contributing.	To	be	sure,	the	
thresholds	 can	 be	 rather	 low.	 Even	 so,	 they	 must	 be	 suitably	 sensitive	 to	 the	
circumstances,	including	the	efficacy	of	the	relevant	contribution.	Although	it	should	last	
a	long	time,	even	a	search	party	for	a	lost	child	need	not	continue	forever.	Obligations	
come	 to	 an	 end	 somewhere,	 and	 their	 limits	 depend	 in	 part	 on	 the	 efficacy	
considerations.15	
In	 order	 to	 get	 a	 better	 sense	 of	 how	 feasibility	 and	 redundancy	 bear	 on	 the	
obligations	people	have,	 I	consider	two	variants	of	 the	problem	of	 insignificant	hands.	
The	problem	of	too	few	hands	concerns	situations	in	which	the	number	of	 individuals	
who	are	willing	to	contribute	to	an	outcome	is	lower	than	the	number	that	is	needed	to	















Three	 Hikers.	 Three	 hikers,	 Aiko,	 Bartoli	 and	 Caleb,	 meet	 Delta,	 a	 severely	
dehydrated	hiker.	Each	of	 the	 three	hikers	has	drunk	enough	water	 to	make	 it	




survive	precisely	 if	 she	drinks	 three	bottles	 that	are	half	 full.	This	 somewhat	artificial	
assumption	is	crucial	at	first,	but	I	will	relax	it	later.	As	an	example	of	the	problem	of	too	



















to	 be	 feasible,	 it	must	 be	 possible	 in	 the	 circumstances	 at	 hand	 (Wiens	 2015).16	 It	 is	
possible	to	climb	Mount	Everest,	for	instance,	but	it	might	not	be	feasible	in	the	prevailing	
weather	conditions.	As	Unwilling	Hiker	 illustrates,	what	 is	 feasible	can	also	depend	on	
what	other	people	do.	It	is	not	feasible	for	Bartoli	and	Caleb	to	help	save	Hydra,	because,	
given	the	volitions	he	actually	has,	Aoki	will	not	contribute.	In	the	circumstances	at	hand,	
they	 cannot	 do	 anything	 other	 than	 take	 his	 unwillingness	 as	 given.	 However,	 when	
considering	what	is	possible,	volitions	should	not	be	regarded	as	fixed.	Presumably,	there	

























issue	 is	 that	 the	 outcome	 is	 not	 feasible.	 It	 follows	 that	 infeasible	 outcomes	 do	 not	
obligate.19	
The	core	of	 the	moderate	solution	can	be	captured	as	 follows:	contribute	 if	 the	
prospect	 of	 being	 instrumental	 to	 success	 is	 good	 enough.	 In	 order	 to	 apply	 this	 idea	
correctly,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 realize	 that	 what	 is	 feasible	 can	 differ	 between	 people.	
Suppose	 that	 Alejandra	 and	 Thiago	 have	 been	 practicing	 the	 Argentinean	 tango,	 but	
 
18	It	is	worth	emphasizing	that	I	am	concerned	here	with	contributions	that	are	futile	ex	














the	relevant	notion	of	 feasibility	 is	agent-relative.	This	 is	of	crucial	 importance	for	the	
relation	between	feasibility	and	obligation.	As	just	discussed,	saving	Delta	is	not	feasible	








nothing	 (Björnsson	 2014;	 Dietz	 2016).	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 I	 propose	 that	 feasibility	 is	 a	
















According	 to	 Julia	Nefsky	 (2017),	 individuals	who	do	not	have	an	obligation	 to	
contribute	can	still	have	reason	to	do	so,	even	though	this	reason	may	be	very	weak.	An	






that	 Nefsky’s	 claim	 should	 be	 reformulated	 as	 follows:	 an	 individual	 has	 reason	 to	
contribute	 to	 a	 morally	 desirable	 outcome	 whenever	 that	 outcome	 is	 feasible.	 The	
underlying	idea	is	that	in	such	situations,	he	might	help	bring	it	about.22	
According	 to	 the	 prospect	 account,	 however,	 an	 individual	 has	 no	 reason	 to	
contribute	at	all	when	the	prospect	of	helping	to	bring	about	the	outcome	is	not	good	
enough.	 Moral	 norms	 feature	 pro	 tanto	 obligations,	 and	 an	 individual	 has	 such	 an	
obligation	only	if	the	norm	applies	to	him.	This	requires	that	PROSPECT’s	conditions	be	




































to	 contribute	 to	 a	 collective	 outcome	as	 ‘the	duty	 to	 join	 forces’	 (Hindriks	2019).	 For	










to	 the	 outcome.	 Then,	 I	 will	 say,	 her	 act	 of	 mobilizing	 him	 constitutes	 an	 indirect	
contribution	to	the	outcome.	Direct	contributions,	by	contrast,	are	not	mediated	by	other	
individuals.		
Just	 like	 direct	 contributions,	 indirect	 contributions	 are	 required	 only	 if	 their	
prospect	is	good	enough.	Compare	two	versions	of	Joyguzzlers:	 in	the	first	version,	the	
protagonists	 are	 climate	 change	 skeptics;	 in	 the	 second,	 they	 are	 climate	 change	














be	 that	 in	 principle,	 everybody	 ought	 to	 contribute	 both	 directly	 and	 indirectly.	 The	
problem	is,	however,	that	the	duty	to	mobilize	often	arises	because	others	are	unwilling	
to	 contribute.	 Someone	 who	 is	 committed	 to	 INDEPENDENCE	 cannot	 accept	 this.	
Consider,	however,	someone	who	has	no	reason	to	believe	that	she	can	contribute	to	a	





for	 the	 possibility	 of	 someone’s	 having	 a	 duty	 to	 mobilize	 others	 without	 having	 an	
obligation	to	contribute	directly.	This	is	the	case	when,	at	that	point,	the	prospect	of	the	
latter	 is	 too	 low,	whereas	 the	prospect	 of	 the	 former	 is	 good	enough.	 It	might	be,	 for	
instance,	that	citizens	do	not	have	an	obligation	to	refrain	from	joyguzzling,	while	they	do	















for	 this	 is	 that	 I	do	not	 insist	on	control.	 Instead,	 the	causal	 condition	of	 the	prospect	
account	concerns	two	probabilities:	the	probability	that	the	outcome	materializes	and	the	
extent	to	which	that	probability	increases	due	to	the	individual	at	issue.	These	have	to	be	















To	 investigate	 redundancy,	 I	 consider	 the	 problem	of	 too	many	 hands.	 This	 concerns	
situations	in	which	the	number	of	willing	individuals	exceeds	that	required	to	bring	about	
the	 outcome.	 If	 everybody	 were	 to	 contribute	 in	 ‘too	 many	 hands	 cases,’	 some	
contributions	 would	 be	 redundant.	 The	 question	 I	 am	 asking	 is	 whether	 all	 of	 the	
 26 



















































account	 in	 judging	 rightness’	 (1971,	 p.26).	 Does	 this	 also	 hold	 for	 the	 efficacy	
considerations?	In	this	section,	I	explore	whether	the	prospect	account	is	consistent	with	
deontology	 and	 consequentialism.	 I	 refer	 to	prospect	 deontology	 as	 ‘PRO-DEO’	 and	 to	
prospect	 consequentialism	 as	 ‘PRO-CON.’	 As	 it	 turns	 out,	 the	 prospect	 account	 is	
inconsistent	 with	 act	 consequentialism.	 However,	 it	 can	 readily	 be	 combined	 with	















26	 See,	 for	 instance,	 Sen	 (1974,	 76)	 and	 Binmore	 (1994,	 pp.154-57).	 For	 a	 qualified	
version	of	this	claim,	see	Braham	and	Van	Hees	(2015,	p.257).	
27	 Johnson	 criticizes	 this	 proposal:	 ‘it	 is	 a	 mistake	 to	 see	 our	 primary	 obligation	 as	
unilaterally	reducing	our	individual	burden	on	the	environment’	(2003,	p.286).	He	rejects	
it	 because	 of	 a	 concern	 with	 feasibility:	 ‘At	 least	 in	 addressing	 commons	 problems,	
unilateral,	 voluntary	 actions	 typically	 have	 no	 reasonable	 chance	 of	 achieving	 their	





Kantians	must	 support	 the	maximal	 solution.	 Because	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 two	 extreme	
solutions,	I	refer	to	this	reading	of	Kant	as	‘the	extreme	interpretation.’		
	 The	 problem	 with	 this	 interpretation	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 pay	 the	 distinction	
between	maxims	 and	 actions	 its	 due.	 Kant’s	 (2011)	 Formula	 of	 Universal	 Law	 (FUL)	
applies	 to	 maxims.	 There	 is	 some	 controversy	 over	 how	 exactly	 this	 should	 be	









When	someone	could	contribute	 to	a	possible	morally	 significant	outcome,	 she	




28	 Sandler	 argues	 that	 Kantianism	 cannot	 accommodate	 unintended	 consequences	
because	they	‘are	not	a	necessary	means	to	the	ends	sought’	(2009,	p.173).	For	instance,	
‘the	continuing	buildup	of	greenhouse	gases	 in	 the	atmosphere	 is	not	sought	by	those	
whose	actions	contribute	to	it,	nor	is	it	a	means	to	any	end	that	is	sought’	(ibid.).	On	my	
interpretation,	 an	 individual	 should	 consider	 those	 consequences	 and	 ask	 whether	
contributing	 to	 them	 is	permitted	by	a	maxim	 that	accords	with	 the	FUL.	 In	 this	way,	
Kantianism	does	take	unintended	consequences	into	account.		
 30 
that	 the	 maxim	 requires	 in	 the	 situation	 at	 hand.	 Doing	 so	 requires	 considering	 the	




easy	 to	 lose	 sight	of	 this	because	 this	 second	step	 is	 trivial	 in	 cases	 such	as	 lying	and	
promising.	It	makes	a	difference	when	benefits	and	harms	are	concerned,	however.	The	


























some	point,	 they	decide	 to	go	home	and	cook	dinner	 for	 their	own	children.	Now	 the	








Next,	 consider	 contractualism.	 According	 to	 Thomas	 Scanlon	 (1998,	 2011),	 a	
moral	principle	 is	 valid	precisely	 if	 no	one	 can	 reasonably	 reject	 it.	An	 individual	 can	
object	 to	 a	 principle	 when	 he	 is	 burdened	 by	 it	 as	 long	 as	 he	 does	 so	 in	 terms	 of	
considerations	 that	 can	 be	 evaluated	 by	 relying	 ‘on	 commonly	 available	 information	
about	what	people	have	reason	to	want’	(Scanlon	1998,	p.204).	Although	it	abstracts	from	
specific	 features	 of	 particular	 individuals,	 contractualism	 takes	 people’s	 actual	
 




circumstances,	 including	 their	 interests,	 into	 account	 right	 from	 the	 start.	 When	 a	







suppose	 that	 a	 principle	 burdens	 someone,	 but	 every	 alternative	 imposes	 a	 greater	
burden	on	someone	else.	Because	of	 the	 latter,	 the	 former	does	not	 constitute	a	valid	
objection	to	the	principle	at	issue	(Ashford	and	Mulgan	2018).	In	Thousand	Hikers*,	993	
hikers	 could	 reasonably	 reject	 the	 principle	 that	 each	 must	 contribute,	 given	 that	 it	
burdens	them	without	benefiting	anybody.	Suppose	that,	in	Joyguzzlers,	several	lives	are	
at	 stake.	 Contractualism	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 their	 combined	
significance.	Instead,	the	benefit	of	a	single	life	 is	to	be	compared	to	the	burden	that	a	
prohibition	 on	 joyguzzling	 would	 impose	 on	 a	 single	 joyguzzler.	 Scanlon	 considers	
redundancy	explicitly	when	he	argues	that	when	more	people	can	contribute	than	are	
needed,	it	is	permissible	for	some	not	to	do	so	as	long	as	there	is	‘some	fair	mechanism	
for	 deciding	 who	 should	 be	 released	 from	 contributing’	 (ibid.,	 p.213).	 Scanlon’s	 own	
example	 is	rolling	a	die.	Relying	on	numbered	T-shirts	 is	a	 fair	selection	procedure	as	
well.	Those	wearing	a	T-shirt	with	the	number	7	on	it	cannot	reasonably	reject	a	principle	
that	 requires	 them	 to	 contribute.	 Had	 some	 other	 number	 been	 effective	 and	 salient,	
others	 would	 have	 incurred	 the	 burden.	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 no	 less	 burdensome	
method	for	saving	the	life	of	the	dehydrated	hiker.	
 33 
Contractualism	 takes	 the	prospect	 of	 success	 into	 account	 in	 other	 respects	 as	
well.	First,	there	is	a	limit	to	the	burden	that	an	individual	can	reasonably	be	expected	to	
bear.	For	 instance,	 the	Rescue	Principle	 features	a	 ‘moderate	…	 threshold	of	 sacrifice’	
(Scanlon	1998,	p.224).	This	threshold	depends	in	part	on	the	benefit	that	someone	else	
















30	 Ashford	 and	Mulgan	 (2018,	 section	 11)	 argue	 that	 contractualism	 is	 committed	 to	
prohibiting	risky	social	activities	such	as	driving	because	it	abstracts	from	the	probability	
with	 which	 an	 agent	 incurs	 a	 burden.	 However,	 Scanlon	 (1998,	 p.209)	 regards	 this	
probability	as	irrelevant	only	to	determining	the	significance	of	the	objection.	He	does	
take	it	to	bear	on	the	measures	people	should	take	to	reduce	the	risk	of	the	burden.	








words,	 the	 probability	 of	 my	 being	 ‘the	 threshold	 passenger’	 is	 very	 low.	 In	 light	 of	







minus	 the	 expected	 costs	 of	 contributing.	 Even	when	 only	 one	 contribution	makes	 a	
difference,	all	of	them	can	have	a	positive	expected	utility.	Shelly	Kagan	(2011)	invokes	
















chicken	 all	 refrained	 from	 doing	 so,	 24	 contributions	would	 be	 redundant.	 Thus,	 the	
theory	allows	for	contributions	that	are	 inefficacious.	However,	 it	will	not	require	any	
contributions	to	outcomes	that	are	expected	 to	be	 infeasible	or	that	are	expected	 to	be	
redundant.	Neither	increases	the	probability	of	the	outcome.	Thus,	the	theory	does	not	
regard	any	expected	risk	of	overshooting	or	undershooting	as	morally	acceptable.	This	



















required,	 no	 matter	 how	 small	 or	 how	 minimal	 the	 benefit.	 Thus,	 it	 does	 not	
systematically	 allow	 for	 probability	 increases	 that	 are	 insufficient	 and	 not	worth	 the	
effort.	Second,	 it	does	not	take	the	total	probability	of	the	outcome	into	account	at	all.	






core	 commitment	 is	 that	 the	 maximization	 test	 applies	 to	 rules	 rather	 than	 actions.	
Because	rules	come	with	application	conditions,	I	propose	that	the	test	should	be	applied	
to	what	I	have	called	‘moral	principles,’	which	consist	of	norms	or	rules	combined	with	






















can	 apply	 to	 simple	 rules	 such	 as	 ‘Do	 no	 harm,’	 its	 application	 conditions	 might	 be	
regarded	as	complex.	The	first	thing	to	note,	however,	is	that	people	may	be	more	prone	
to	accept	moral	principles	that	feature	the	application	conditions	of	the	prospect	account	









The	 problem	 of	 insignificant	 hands	 concerns	 collective	 outcomes	 that	 are	 morally	
significant	and	individual	hands	that	are	morally	insignificant	in	and	of	themselves.	I	have	
asked	whether	 and	when	 people	 are	 required	 to	 contribute	 in	 situations	 that	 exhibit	
 38 
these	 features.	 According	 to	 the	 prospect	 account	 that	 I	 have	 presented	 here,	 an	
individual	can	indeed	be	required	to	contribute.	This	is	not	because	in	some	miraculous	
way	her	contribution	is	morally	significant	after	all.	 Instead,	 it	 is	because	a	number	of	
individual	 contributions	 can	 add	 up	 to	 a	 morally	 significant	 effect.	 Contributing	 is	
required	when	the	prospect	of	this	being	the	case	is	good	enough.		
In	order	for	what	I	have	called	‘the	prospect	of	success’	to	be	good	enough,	three	
conditions	have	 to	be	met.	First,	 the	contribution	must	 increase	 the	probability	of	 the	
outcome	 to	 an	 extent	 that	 is	 non-negligible.	 Second,	 given	 this	 increase,	 the	 total	
probability	must	be	high	enough.	Third,	the	relevant	individual	must	have	enough	reason	
to	believe	that	these	two	things	are	the	case.	What	counts	as	enough	depends	on	the	moral	
significance	 of	 the	 outcome.	 What	 counts	 as	 negligible	 also	 depends	 on	 the	 morally	
relevant	costs	of	the	action.	The	prospect	account	supports	a	prospect	range	such	that	all	
and	only	the	contributions	within	it	are	required.	Because	of	this,	it	avoids	the	extremes,	















to	 compliance	 levels.	 Furthermore,	because	of	 their	 commitment	 to	maximization,	 act	
consequentialists	cannot	embrace	the	thresholds	that	feature	in	it.	The	former	theories	
are	not	sensitive	to	what	others	do	at	all;	the	latter	are	too	sensitive.	Even	so,	the	prospect	
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